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Abstract
Empathy with others’ successes and misfortunes is a critical component of group living 
that promotes social cohesion. Unfortunately, empathy is a malleable phenomenon in 
that its elicitation is not automatic, but modulated by multiple interlocking factors. This 
chapter explores the specific phenomenon of intergroup empathy bias—the difference in 
empathy for members of social ingroups versus outgroups—which poses profound chal‐
lenges for our modern human world characterized by a multitude of groups, ethnicities, 
and cultures. The chapter frames the discussion by contextualizing empathy as consist‐
ing of three interacting component processes, namely experience sharing, perspective 
taking, and empathic concern. It then goes on to examine research describing the effects 
of intergroup bias on each of these component processes. Next, it explores the factors, 
both at the level of the group and at the level of the individual, which may contribute 
to empathic breakdown in intergroup contexts. Finally, it considers strategies that may 
have potential in mitigating intergroup empathy bias. Here, we draw on our own experi‐
ences in the South African context, which is characterized by pervasive racial inequality 
and legacies of apartheid violence, to suggest that intergroup empathy is best stimulated 
in a context of reciprocal mutual engagement with the other.
Keywords: intergroup, empathy, experience sharing, perspective taking, empathic 
concern
1. Introduction
Humans are ultra‐social organisms, because they form and depend on organizations that 
extend beyond the individual [1]. This social interdependence arguably evolved because 
group living, and its associated social functions, offered several reproductive and long‐term 
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survival advantages, compared to going solo [2]. In turn, these social functions necessitated 
the evolution of more sophisticated cognitive and emotional capacities, like theory of mind 
and moral emotions, to enable thriving within a group context [3]. Critical among these is our 
ability to empathize: the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner reality of another 
person, while recognizing that their emotional experience is separate from our own [4]. 
Empathizing with others in distress is particularly important because it motivates behavior 
aimed at alleviating those others’ suffering, and this, in turn, promotes social cohesion and 
resource‐sharing among members of society [5, 6].
Unfortunately, witnessing a person in distress does not inevitably evoke feelings of empa‐
thy, nor does it always result in prosocial helping behavior. Even though we may encounter 
many potential empathy‐eliciting scenarios in our everyday lives, we respond with empathy 
to only a fraction of them [7, 8]. In fact, recent evidence suggests that empathic failures are 
not always characterized by attenuated empathy or indifference, but quite often by counter‐
empathic responses, like Schadenfreude and Glückschmerz, which may facilitate hostility [9, 
10]. Empathic reactions are therefore not automatic, but rather, the degree to which we respond 
empathically are modulated by multiple interlocking factors, which science is only beginning 
to unravel. For example, growing evidence suggests that empathic responding is influenced 
significantly by personal features of the empathizer (e.g., gender, trait empathy, childhood 
trauma), by interpersonal factors (e.g., perceived fairness, social stigma), by cultural factors 
(e.g., interdependence vs. independence, preference for social hierarchy), and importantly, by 
the social group membership of the person in distress (e.g., race, political affiliation, sports team 
identification) [11–18]. Although empathy for one’s own social group is particularly important 
and holds several long‐term advantages [19], the flipside of this phenomenon, i.e., diminished 
empathy for the outgroup, poses profound challenges for our modern human world where a 
multitude of groups, ethnicities, and cultures compete for the same resources [20].
This chapter explores a fundamentally important, albeit less attractive, feature of empathy, 
namely, its breakdown in response to the pain of outgroup others. In particular, it asks the fol‐
lowing questions: Where and how does the empathic process break down? Which factors exac‐
erbate this empathic failure? And is it possible to ameliorate, or even reverse, these effects? The 
chapter frames the discussion by contextualizing empathy as consisting of three interacting 
component processes, namely, experience sharing, perspective taking, and empathic concern. 
It then goes on to examine research describing the effects of intergroup bias on each of these 
component processes. Next, it explores the factors, both at the level of the group and at the 
level of the individual, which may contribute to empathic breakdown in intergroup contexts. 
Finally, it considers strategies that may have potential in mitigating intergroup empathy bias.
2. Empathy component processes
Empathy is a complex psychological phenomenon. Whereas early conceptualizations of empa‐
thy have typically stressed either its cognitive or affective aspects [21], more recent research 
considers empathy a multidimensional construct that may be parsed into three dissociable but 
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interacting neurocognitive components: emotional sharing, perspective taking, and empathic 
concern [22, 23].
Emotional sharing constitutes the affective component of empathy and is also commonly 
referred to as emotion contagion or affective resonance. It refers to the automatic capacity to 
become aroused by another’s emotions and relies on subcortical emotion circuits [7]. For 
example, seeing an angered individual may lead the empathic observer to vicariously experi‐
ence similar feelings.
Perspective taking constitutes the cognitive component of empathy and refers to the capacity 
to view a situation from another’s point of view, or to put oneself in their shoes, as it were. 
Doing this allows one to better recognize and understand another person’s affective experi‐
ence. It therefore partly overlaps with theory of mind‐like processing and relies on the men‐
talizing network [24, 25]. Because perspective taking begins with the perception of affective 
signals from another individual, low‐level processes involved in face perception and emotion 
recognition are integral to understanding another individual’s internal state [26].
Finally, empathic concern constitutes the motivational component of empathy and refers to 
other‐oriented feelings of care and compassion when perceiving an individual in distress. 
The experience of empathic concern may stimulate prosocial helping or caring behaviors in 
the observer [5, 27]. Recent neuroimaging studies have highlighted the role of the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC)  [13] and septal area [25] in empathy‐driven prosocial motivation.
Each empathic component is sensitive to both bottom‐up automatic affective processes and 
to top‐down perceiver‐controlled cognitive processes, which feed into each other [7]. For 
example, too much affective arousal may result in personal distress within the observer, pro‐
moting a self‐focused escape response rather than other‐oriented empathic response [28]. In 
turn, executive functions serve to consciously regulate the self‐focused distress response, so 
that an awareness of the other’s perspective and concern for their circumstances becomes pos‐
sible [29]. These interconnected mechanisms function together to produce an overall empathic 
response that combines automatic experience sharing as well as intentional feelings of concern.
3. Intergroup empathy bias
Abundant evidence from social psychology suggests that individuals instinctively catego‐
rize themselves into salient social groups with which they identify and with whom they feel 
a sense of belonging [30, 31]. Unfortunately, this categorization also maximizes differences 
between groups, leading people to more readily distrust, fear, and discriminate against out‐
group members and to instinctively favor or side with members of social groups with which 
they identify [32].
Importantly, this intergroup bias has been shown to impact emotional responding toward 
others when it matters most—when they are in pain. Whereas greater empathy toward one’s 
ingroup makes sense from an evolutionary perspective [20], empathic failures toward out‐
group members may lie at the heart of most intergroup conflict situations, including political 
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violence, xenophobia, and genocide [33]. Interestingly, outgroup empathy failures do not seem 
to depend on a person’s trait empathic concern [34]. That is, even the most deeply empathic 
person can mute their empathic response toward a perceived enemy under the right circum‐
stances—a phenomenon that has been referred to as the mind’s “empathy gap” [35]. Although 
the mechanism that underlies this empathy gap remains unclear, studies investigating inter‐
group empathy have demonstrated that outgroup membership status can compromise all 
levels of empathic responding (i.e., affective, cognitive, and motivational), as well as helping 
behavior [18, 36–38].
An important aspect of intergroup bias is the fact that it appears to depend heavily on the per‐
ceiver’s social motivation: various studies have shown that self‐categorization broadly along 
some ingroup/outgroup distinction is flexible and that re‐categorization with an arbitrarily 
defined group may be sufficient to override automatic response biases [39]. In these studies, 
participants are typically assigned to novel groups using a minimal group paradigm [40] and 
then subjected to a variety of tasks assessing perceptual, affective, and behavioral ingroup 
biases [41–44]. Recently, researchers have specifically advocated the advantages of assigning 
people to novel groups, rather than focusing on specific social or historic groups, to advance 
our understanding of the processes that guide intergroup behavior across multiple contexts 
and levels of analysis [45].
When it comes to empathic responding more specifically, arbitrary group categorization by 
way of a minimal group manipulation can also facilitate intergroup biases, particularly when 
the groups are in competition [9]. For example, previous research found that similar group 
membership between a helper and target (regardless of whether the group was real or arti‐
ficially determined) strengthened the role of empathy and helping [46]. Similarly, mere cat‐
egorization of participants into non‐relevant social groups appears sufficient to facilitate an 
ingroup bias in empathy for physical pain [47].
Not many studies have explored the relationship between race and minimal group biases in 
empathic responding, however, and results from these studies are inconsistent. For example, 
in a recent study, participants showed clear minimal group biases (unaffected by race) on both 
an explicit group identification and implicit affective priming task, whereas neural imaging 
responses were indicative of significantly greater empathic arousal in response to own‐race 
compared to other‐race individuals [48]. The authors concluded that racial categorization may 
be a stronger modulator of the ingroup bias in empathic neural processing than general social 
group categorization (i.e., by assigning participants into random teams). One possible reason 
for this finding is that humans may (automatically) detect and encode race as a by‐product of 
an adaptation to identify fellow group members [49, 50]. Given that findings to date have been 
inconclusive, however, more research will be necessary to tease apart these effects (see also [51]).
3.1. Group membership and emotional sharing
Emotional sharing is important in the context of empathy, because it plays a fundamental role 
in generating the motivation to care for and help another individual in distress [52]. Despite a 
general notion that affective arousal is automatic, empirical evidence suggests that many vari‐
ables, including a priori attitudes and culturally learned associations, affect its induction in the 
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observer (see e.g. [53, 54]). Notably, reduced affective resonance when viewing an outgroup 
member in pain may be associated with fewer physiological signals from the observer’s body 
to help interpret the other individual’s emotional state and stimulate prosocial action [26].
Various studies exploring affective resonance in response to in‐ and outgroup members in 
physical pain found dampened autonomic arousal in response to outgroup members’ pain 
[17, 37]. Interestingly, in these studies, greater levels of racial prejudice on implicit mea‐
sures of prejudice were associated with greater lack of empathic arousal toward outgroup 
members. Reduced emotional sharing in response to outgroup members is not exclusive 
to scenarios of physical pain; however, it also extends to scenarios of emotional pain. For 
example, Gutsell and Inzlicht [55] recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) alpha oscillations 
when participants observed ingroup and outgroup members expressing sadness. They found 
that, whereas participants showed similar activation patterns when experiencing sadness 
themselves and when observing ingroup members feeling sad, participants did not show 
these same vicarious activation patterns when observing outgroup members feeling sad. 
Participants thus appeared to experience reduced emotional sharing in response to outgroup 
members’ sadness, and this became more pronounced the more prejudiced they were.
Several neuroimaging studies have shown that intergroup empathy bias may also manifest 
as increased hemodynamic activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior 
insula—areas thought to underlie the subjective representation of affective distress [18, 
56, 57]. Notably, in a recent study, we detected significantly enhanced amygdala activity 
in response to own‐race compared to other‐race individuals in perceived physical pain 
[58]. The amygdala is typically activated during events high in emotional salience or nov‐
elty and may direct attention to motivationally relevant stimuli [59]. We thus argued that 
heightened amygdala activation toward same‐race individuals in pain reflects approach‐
related motivation and attention in line with task demands, which urged participants to 
empathize with individuals in distress [39].
3.2. Group membership and perspective taking
At the level of emotion recognition, research suggests that observers are faster and more accu‐
rate at distinguishing own‐race compared to other‐races faces [60] and are better at identify‐
ing emotional expressions of racial ingroup compared to outgroup members [54, 61]. Research 
has also found that people are less likely to attribute secondary emotions, which are uniquely 
human characteristics, to outgroup compared to ingroup members [38, 62].
When it comes to perspective taking, people appear to be more likely, or more accurate, in tak‐
ing the perspective of an ingroup member compared to an outgroup member. For example, 
when Asian and White participants viewed photographs of members of both racial groups 
in negative contexts (e.g., illness, grief, injury) and positive contexts (e.g., party, amuse‐
ment, smiling), participant self‐report data indicated greater perspective taking and empathy 
for own‐race members than other‐race members, particularly in the negative contexts [36]. 
Furthermore, several neuroimaging studies, including our own, demonstrated stronger hemo‐
dynamic activation in response to others’ pain for racial ingroups versus outgroups in regions 
associated with mentalizing, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporoparietal 
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junction (TPJ), and precuneus [12, 58, 63]. In our study, we concluded that, because these areas 
form part of networks implicated in self‐referential processing, episodic memory retrieval, 
and thinking about other minds, heightened activity may allow for a richer representation of 
another’s physical/psychological pain. By implication, reduced activity in these areas suggests 
impaired perspective taking when it comes to outgroup members.
Perspective taking is thought to enhance empathy by creating increased overlap between 
“self” and “other” cognitive representations, thereby reducing the self‐other gap [64]. Merging 
another individual into one’s self‐concept thus results in a feeling of “oneness” and a sense of 
shared identity with the other person, which facilitates understanding someone else’s emo‐
tions as if they were one’s own. Unfortunately, people experience self‐other merging much 
more easily with those whom they perceive as more similar to themselves, such as family 
members and close friends [65].
3.3. Group membership, empathic concern, and helping behavior
Various lines of evidence suggest that empathic concern and resulting helping behaviors are 
affected by intergroup biases. For example, Drwecki et al. [66] found that White participants 
reported greater empathic concern for White individuals in pain than for Black individuals 
in pain, and offered higher levels of analgesic treatment for ingroup compared to outgroup 
members. Also, in two neuroimaging studies, empathy‐related neural activity when observ‐
ing ingroup members’ suffering relative to outgroup members’ suffering predicted greater 
willingness to donate time and money [63], as well as greater costly helping [18] for ingroup 
members at a later stage.
The literature on helping behavior is complex, however, and a variety of factors may influ‐
ence one’s decision to offer help, including altruistic motivation, a sense of similarity with the 
outgroup, self‐regulatory depletion, and competitive or status‐related processes [26, 67]. A 
quantitative meta‐analysis of White individuals’ helping directed toward Black individuals 
indicated no overall tendency to discriminate against racial outgroup members [68]. Instead, 
White individuals tended to help Black and White individuals equally, except when helping 
required considerable effort, time, or risk, which then resulted in an ingroup bias in help‐
ing. Broadly speaking, the literature suggests that when helping requires greater resources, 
individuals may cognitively justify not helping by basing their decision on reasons other than 
the (racial) outgroup of the person in need. Although helping ingroup members may thus 
be motivated largely by empathic concern, helping outgroup members may involve further 
systematic decision‐making based on the costs and benefits of offering help [46].
4. Factors that contribute to empathic breakdown in intergroup contexts
In recent years, at least two things have become increasingly apparent in intergroup research: 
social group membership is highly flexible and context‐dependent, and not all outgroups 
elicit intergroup empathy bias equally. In trying to tease apart the complex array of factors 
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that influence intergroup responding—at least at the level of the group—Cikara and van Bavel 
[45] have recently argued that two factors are critical: functional relations between groups 
(shared, competing, or independent goals) and relative group status (access to resources).
Empathic breakdown between members of rival or conflict groups is well documented [69–71]. 
People’s relationships to others play a significant role in determining how they respond to their 
suffering: whereas a friend’s misfortune typically elicits empathy, a foe’s misfortune might 
be experienced as less distressing, or even as pleasurable [72, 73]. Unfortunately, intergroup 
contexts tend to exacerbate people’s motivation not to empathize or care about someone else’s 
misfortune, in that groups may provoke significantly more competition and aggression than 
interpersonal interactions [10, 74].
Explicit competition between groups has the effect of increasing the salience of social identity 
and generally strengthens the positive relationship between ingroup identification and inter‐
group bias and hostility [31, 75]. For example, in a neuroimaging study of real‐world sports 
rivalry between avid fans of the Red Sox and Yankees baseball teams, ingroup team failures 
were associated with increased activity in neural areas associated with the subjective experi‐
ence of pain [76]. In contrast, outgroup team failures were associated with increased self‐
reported pleasure and activity in neural areas associated with reward processing. Moreover, 
and rather disturbingly, the more positive value (pleasure) participants attached to rival team 
failures, the more they were willing to aggress against a fan of the rival team. Similar results 
were also observed when novel groups were pitted against each other [9]. Of significance 
is that in the latter study, intergroup empathy bias between competing groups was robust 
beyond contexts that defined the groups themselves, and even when the competitive threat of 
the outgroup was removed (e.g., feedback that the outgroup has fallen behind).
A second factor central to intergroup dynamics concerns the question of resources: To what 
extent does a social group have the power to carry out their intentions? [45]. Groups higher up 
the social hierarchy have more status and greater access to resources, and thus greater poten‐
tial threat value, whereas groups lower down the hierarchy are typically scorned and pose less 
of a threat [77]. Even without overt competition, differences in power and resources between 
groups have been shown to predict perceptions of competitiveness [78]. Importantly, histori‐
cal asymmetries in power and status between groups affect intergroup empathic responding, 
as well as lower level perceptual processes that operate outside awareness [79].
In an interesting study assessing people’s perceptions of Black and White pain, the authors 
detected a consistent racial bias in evaluations, such that Black people were consistently per‐
ceived to experience less pain than White people [80]. Crucially, this bias in pain perception 
(by both Black and White Americans, including nursing professionals) could not be attributed 
to racial prejudice, but instead appeared rooted in perceptions of status and the privilege 
or hardship it confers. Hence, the less privileged a target seemed, the less pain participants 
thought he/she would experience. In a similar vein, another study using facial electromyog‐
raphy showed that an individual’s relative social status affects how other people respond to 
their misfortune: participants felt less bad and smiled more when negative events happened 
to high‐status compared to low‐status individuals [81].
A Less Attractive Feature of Empathy: Intergroup Empathy Bias
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.69287
51
Although group membership significantly impacts empathic responding, empathy is not 
solely influenced by external factors, such as the race or status of the person in distress. 
Individual differences of the perceiver may also moderate the extent to which there is an 
intergroup bias in empathic responding. That is, based on individual traits, some people 
might be more likely to show strong intergroup biases in empathic responding than others.
Empirical studies show that the strength of racial identification may contribute to intergroup 
bias in empathic responding [63, 82]. Although social group membership defined according 
to race is a prominent aspect of interactions among individuals, the extent to which people 
identify with their own racial group varies from person to person [83]. Some individuals 
regard their racial identity as a crucial part of their self‐concept, whereas others may not feel 
a strong belonging to their racial group. Strong racial identification makes it more likely that 
an individual will process the emotions of racial ingroup members in a self‐referential man‐
ner, resulting in greater empathy toward own‐race individuals. Interestingly, some research 
suggests that pervasive discrimination against members of disadvantaged groups is associ‐
ated with increased ingroup identification, which, in turn, may alleviate some of the negative 
psychological consequences of societal dehumanization [84, 85].
Another important factor that contributes to variation in intergroup relations is motivation to 
respond without prejudice [86]. Because overt racial discrimination is not socially acceptable, 
society generally favors individuals who act in non‐prejudiced ways. Hence, individuals are 
motivated to alter their behavior to appear non‐prejudiced. The strength of the motivations 
to respond without prejudice, and the extent to which these motivations influence behavior, 
however, vary between individuals [87]. Furthermore, people may be motivated primarily by 
sincere changes in their personal attitude (internally motivated; IMS), or they may be moti‐
vated primarily by external pressures to avoid judgment or punishment from others (exter‐
nally motivated; EMS) [88].
Data from our research have shown that different motivations to appear non‐prejudiced can 
modulate intergroup empathic responding. For example, in a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study of intergroup empathy, higher EMS scores in White participants were 
associated with dampened neural empathic responses toward Black individuals in both phys‐
ical and emotional distress [58]. And in another study, higher IMS scores in White partici‐
pants were positively associated with prosocial helping behavior toward a Black individual 
in distress, whereas higher EMS scores were negatively associated with prosocial helping 
toward that individual [89].
5. Strategies to reduce intergroup empathy bias
In the introductory section of this chapter, we presented an evolutionary perspective as frame‐
work for understanding the social interdependence of human beings that is foundational in 
the development of empathy. In presenting strategies to reduce intergroup empathy bias, we 
draw on theoretical formulations from different branches of psychology regarding the devel‐
opment of empathy in intergroup contexts. Notably, various studies in social  psychology have 
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demonstrated the efficacy of cognitive strategies (e.g., increased attention to an individual’s 
feelings vs. his/her group status), manipulating the intergroup relationship (e.g., coopera‐
tive vs. competitive), manipulating group membership (e.g., recategorizing or decategorizing 
individuals), blurring group boundaries (e.g., reducing perceptions of group entitativity), and 
effortful perspective taking, in reducing intergroup empathy bias [9, 51, 90–92]. While suc‐
cess in reducing intergroup empathy bias along these lines is thus possible, results of such 
strategies appear to be highly context dependent [93]. Moreover, investigators have rarely 
evaluated the efficacy of the strategy they employed beyond the immediate study context or 
longitudinally [94].
Scholars influenced by the relational psychoanalytic discipline have often followed a differ‐
ent approach in restoring empathic bonds, observing that the need and proclivity for con‐
nection are central to human development [95]. Stolorow and Atwood, for example, have 
argued for the primacy of interconnectedness and advanced the theory of intersubjectivity—a 
development of self, understood in interaction with others [96]. Accordingly, connection with 
others is fundamental in the development of one’s identity, and experience and subjectiv‐
ity are shaped by these relationships with others. The intersubjective epistemological model 
provides an important conceptual guideline for understanding the deeper significance of pro‐
cesses of perspective taking that unfold in intergroup encounters, which may, in turn, lead to 
the strengthening of empathic bonds.
Specifically, the subtleties of the dynamic at play in dialogic intergroup encounters are shaped 
by the reciprocal influence and mutual awareness that develop in the intersubjective field—cre‐
ated in the coming together of people from two different groups representing two different his‐
torical perspectives. Thus, through a process of genuine listening to the other’s story and pain in 
a facilitated, interactive process, the resonance that unfolds opens up the possibility for individ‐
ual participants from each side to enter into the feeling state of the other. It is in this intersubjec‐
tive engagement with the other’s story that the emergence of shared empathy becomes possible.
We have referred to this unfolding process as “empathic repair” [69], a process of intersubjec‐
tive repair that points to a deeper level of mutual recognition, one that occurs both intrapsy‐
chically and in the participants’ external world through expressions of acknowledgment. This 
mutuality of a shared transformative moment is the fundamental moment of empathic repair 
and reciprocal recognition of the other’s humanity that creates pathways to caring for the 
other as a fellow human being. In the following section, we describe apartheid South Africa 
as a concrete example of intergroup empathy failure and how dialogue processes initiated by 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission opened up possibilities for empathic connection.
5.1. Apartheid South Africa as an example of intergroup empathic failure
Our interest in questions of empathic failures, and how empathic connections between groups 
might be enhanced, grew out of our work in the South African context with its history of inter‐
generational mistrust, hatred, and resentment born out of the violence of policies of apartheid. 
Both physical violence and the kind of violence that results from a lifetime of humiliation, 
passed down across generations of oppressed groups, create boundaries and deep divisions 
in relationships between self and others. This means that starting well before one’s capacity 
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even to make moral choices has been tested, one’s sense of moral obligation toward others is 
rigidly channeled along lines of “us” versus “them,” and the images of “them” depict a group 
that exists only as objectified others. Empathic failure operates under these conditions of a 
deep separation between racial groups as codified in apartheid laws.
As a strategy to find a sustainable way of dealing with these failures of empathy, and under 
Nelson Mandela’s leadership, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was intro‐
duced in South Africa. What happened at the TRC may not be generalizable to all other 
post‐conflict contexts. But what the work of the TRC has shown is that empathic connec‐
tion between former adversaries can indeed be restored. An important condition for this to 
happen is the forging of dialogue and a vocabulary of compromise and tolerance, because 
the exercise of forming that vocabulary involves settling differences through the politics of 
contestation and compromise among people separated by laws based on intergroup hatred.
South Africa’s TRC, with its remarkable stories of forgiveness and healing, was a powerful 
illustration of how under certain conditions, instead of widening boundaries and deepen‐
ing empathic failures, post‐conflict dialogue processes can facilitate genuine connection in an 
intergroup context. Dialogue creates the possibility of setting the actions of “the other” in the 
broader framework of the political‐ideological context that may have supported, and even 
directed, the hateful acts that excluded one from the moral and empathic obligations of “the 
other.” Thus, the politics of abuse that were enshrined in the policies of an oppressive system 
such as apartheid could be acknowledged and confirmed in ways that opened up the possibil‐
ity for the emergence of empathy between former adversaries.
6. Conclusions
Freud remarked that empathy “plays the largest part of our understanding of what is inher‐
ently foreign to our ego in other people” [97]. It is therefore not surprising that situations 
where empathy for another’s distress is absent or reduced are very often also characterized by 
distrust, hatred, violence, discrimination, and even pleasure. The current chapter explored the 
complexities of intergroup empathic responding in an effort to gain a better understanding of 
the mechanisms that govern this process. First, we have shown that group membership affects 
all levels of empathic responding: experience sharing, perspective taking, and empathic con‐
cern. Second, we have pointed out the fluid nature of groups, in that both functional relations 
and differences in power and status may affect intergroup empathic responding at any given 
time. In addition, we have shown how various individual difference characteristics, notably 
racial identification and motivations to respond without prejudice, can influence intergroup 
empathic responding.
The intergroup landscape is not universally bleak, however, and empathic response differ‐
ences across social categories are not inevitable. Drawing on our experiences in post‐apartheid 
South Africa, we believe the intersubjective space that unfolds between former adversaries 
when coming together in facilitated dialogue with each other opens up rich possibilities for 
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a shared empathy and mutual recognition of the other’s humanity. These connections create 
new relational experiences that can help restore historical ruptures.
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